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Abstract.- This paper computes input-specific scores of technical efficiency for a sample 
of water utilities located in the southern Spanish region of Andalusia. In addition, dif-
ferences in efficiency between different operating environments are investigated. Con-
cerning the debate about ownership and efficiency, we find that privately owned com-
panies outperform public utilities in their management of labour. Furthermore, techni-
cal efficiency is found to be greater among firms located in highly populated areas and 
for utilities providing water services to tourist municipalities. Finally, no empirical evi-
dence supporting the greater technical efficiency of consortia of water utilities, a mana-
gerial strategy strongly encouraged by regional politicians, is found.
Keywords: input-specific technical efficiency; Andalusian water utilities; operating 
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1.- Introduction 
Efficiency and productivity measurement is a long-standing issue of study in the field 
of economics. Furthermore, from the eighties onward several papers have focused on 
assessing efficiency in the provision of water services. Existing literature on water utili-
ties has mostly dealt with cost efficiency, a minority of studies being aimed at examin-
ing technical efficiency (the seminal paper by Farrell, 1957 provides precise definitions 
of these concepts). Among the latter, some papers have used mathematical programming 
and non-parametric techniques (Byrnes et al., 1986; Lambert et al., 1993; Anwandter 
and Ozuna, 2002; Tupper and Resende, 2004; Woodbury and Dollery, 2004), while 
some others have followed econometric approaches (Bhattacharyya et al., 1995b; Jones 
and Mygind, 2000; Ménard and Saussier, 2000).
In this paper, we assess the technical performance of a sample of water utilities lo-
cated in the southern Spanish region of Andalusia. Using non-parametric techniques and 
activity models, a set of input-specific scores of technical efficiency is computed at the 
firm level. It is widely accepted that production performance in water utilities is influ-
enced by the skills of firms’ managers in organising production activities, but also by 
the characteristics of the environment in which production activities are carried out 
(Ashton, 2000; Tupper and Resende, 2004). Our hypothesis here is that environmental 
variables might affect the technical management of different production factors in dif-
ferent ways. In order to shed some light on this matter, in a second part of our study sev-
eral hypotheses tests, including some non-parametric ones, are used to test for differ-
ences of input-specific scores of technical efficiency among water utilities categorised 
by different operating environments.
This manuscript contributes to the current strand of literature in several directions. 
On the one hand, it provides empirical evidence as to certain water utilities’ features and 
environmental variables likely to affect technical management of specific production 
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factors. Beyond their academic interest, these findings might provide firms’ managers 
and policy-makers with meaningful information to improve the design of both manage-
ment of water utilities and water policies. On the other hand, as far as we know, our 
paper is pioneering in its focus on efficiency of water management in the Spanish region 
of Andalusia.
Andalusia is located in the south of the Iberian Peninsula and occupies slightly less 
than 20 per cent of the territory of Spain. In recent decades, the region has faced a proc-
ess of increasing desertification, most likely due to climatic change, and an alarming 
water shortage. Besides, in recent years there has been an increasing demand for water 
in which traditional uses compete with new urban and recreational uses, e.g., golf 
courses, motivated by growing urbanization in the region, specially along the seacoast 
(Andalusia has 1,101 kilometres of coast), but also by a massive influx of tourism. Even 
more, many European citizens are fixing their second residence on the Spanish Mediter-
ranean coast. Both desertification and water scarcity, in addition to an increasing de-
mand for this natural resource, have turned efficient management of water in Andalusia 
into a pressing need.
Furthermore, during recent decades important changes in the structure of the Andalu-
sian water industry have been taking place. During the second half of the eighties and 
also in the nineties of the last century, many municipalities transferred the management 
of municipal water utilities to private managers. Besides, both local and regional gov-
ernments gave enthusiastic support to the creation of consortia of water companies 
aimed at providing water services to a geographical area integrated by several munici-
palities. Strong support for these managerial strategies was chiefly based on the argu-
ment that they would lead to important gains in efficiency and productivity. Privatisa-
tion and formation of consortia of water companies in Andalusia continue to occur, even 
though no empirical studies currently exist supporting the alleged benefits of these proc-
esses. The few studies carried out on water provision in Andalusia have mostly focused 
Page 3 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
page 4
on small areas of the regional geography, mainly the city of Seville, dealing with aspects 
like water demand (Martínez-Espiñeira, 2003; Martínez-Espiñera and Nauges, 2004) or 
optimal pricing policies (García-Valiñas, 2005).
The remainder of the manuscript is organised as follows. Section two deals with the 
methodology. Sections three and four describe the data and the results, respectively. 
Finally, section five concludes.
2.- Methodological issues.
Our aim in this paper is, as mentioned, to compute a set of scores of input-specific 
technical efficiency at the firm level. In doing so, we use the methodological approach 
suggested by Torgersen et al. (1996) and Data Envelopment Analysis techniques (DEA). 
DEA was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) in a pioneering paper that used mathe-
matical programming to pursue Farrell’s approach to technical efficiency measurement 
(Farrell, 1957). This contribution to a then new body of literature has, to date, produced 
a wealth of contributions in multiple fields of research. Gattoufi et al. (2004) review the 
empirical literature on DEA, and Thanassoulis (2000a, 2000b) highlights its usefulness 
for analysing efficiency in water companies. In essence, DEA evaluates the performance 
of peer units allowing the construction of a surface over the data that permits the ob-
served behaviour of a decision-making unit to be compared with best observed prac-
tices. Further details on DEA are in Cooper et al. (2004).
Many studies dealing with the assessment of technical performance of decision-
making units have computed single radial Farrell-type measures of efficiency, using the 
standard formulation of DEA. Nevertheless, at times, and particularly in the case of 
samples with small size relative to the number of input and output dimensions, the ex-
tent of inefficiency cannot be fully assessed by computing radial measures only, but also 
slacks need to be considered in order to provide a complete picture of firms’ perform-
Page 4 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
page 5
ance. Torgersen et al. (1996) suggested a two-step procedure to distinguish decision-
making units that are radially efficient, i.e., efficient in a Farrell-Debreu sense, but inef-
ficient in some input or output dimension, from efficient decision-making units in a 
Pareto-Koopmans sense (Koopmans, 1951). For an input-orientation, this paper devel-
ops measures of efficiency that extend the traditional radial efficiency measures to ac-
count for potential input shrinkages due to both proportional reductions and slack ad-
justments1.
In order to develop the main insights of this methodology, let us consider that we ob-
serve a set of k = 1,…, K decision-making units that use a vector x of n = 1,…,N inputs 
to produce a vector y of m = 1,…,M outputs. The first step is to identify the efficient 
subset of decision-making units by solving the following set of linear programming 
problems, one for each decision-making unit k’ in the sample (Charnes et al. 1985):
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(1) 
zk being a set of intensity variables representing the weighting of each observed deci-
sion-making unit k in the composition of the efficient frontier. In addition, ymk and xnk
stand for the observed output m and input n of decision-making unit k, respectively.
The set of constraints in program (1) characterises an output set with variable returns 
to scale satisfying the properties of strong disposability of inputs and outputs, convexity, 
1
 Several other methodological approaches have also been proposed to compute input-specific reductions 
required to attain full (radial and non-radial) technical efficiency (Färe and Lovell, 1978, Färe et al., 1983, 
Zieschang, 1984, Bogetoft and Hougaard, 1998 and Asmild et al., 2003). The difference between ap-
proaches is, primarily, the choice of the reference point on the frontier.
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and the condition that all observations are in the set (see Grosskopf, 1986 for further 
details on the characterisation of the technology). Based on the solutions to program (1), 
the efficient subset of observations H is defined as the set of decision-making units hav-
ing no slacks, neither in inputs (sxnk) nor in outputs (symk):
( )=  =kH k K s 0 (2) 
In a second-step, the input-efficiency measure for each decision-making unit k = 
1,…,K in the sample is computed from a linear programming problem analogous to the 
conventional BCC model (Banker et al. 1984), where the full set of observations is re-
placed by the reference subset of efficient decision-making units H. Formalising for firm 
k’:
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(3) 
The parameter 	 obtained as the solution to program (3) measures the maximal feasi-
ble proportional reduction of all inputs that could be achieved by each decision-making 
unit in the sample without decreasing its level of outputs, i.e., it assesses conventional 
Farrell-type input-oriented technical efficiency at the firm level. Nevertheless, once the 
maximum proportional shrinkage of all inputs has been attained, additional input-
specific reductions may still be feasible in some input directions, while maintaining the 
vector of outputs. These additional shrinkages are measured through the slacks in inputs 
(Sxnk), which can be computed directly at the input level from the optimal solution to 
program (3) and the set of restrictions in (3i).
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Prior to computation of input-specific scores of technical efficiency, both aggregate 
input savings and the efficient use of inputs need to be calculated. The aggregate saving 
of input n needed to bring decision-making unit k’ into a Pareto-Koopmans efficient 
status is computed by adding up radial contractions and input-specific slacks:
( )
' ' ' '
= 	 +saving xnk k nk nkx 1 x S (4) 
The first term on the right hand side of expression (4) measures maximum attainable 
reduction of input n due to the radial contraction of the productive plan of firm k’ to-
wards the frontier, while the second term quantifies the input excess in the direction of 
this production factor. Likewise, the efficient use of input n is computed by subtracting 
the aggregate saving of input n from its observed use, yielding:
( )
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

 =  	 + = 	  
efficient x x
nk nk k nk nk k nk nkx x 1 x S x S (5) 
Finally, the slack-adjusted input-oriented technical efficiency (SAITE) for decision-
making unit k’ and input n is computed as the quotient between the efficient use of that 
input and its actually observed use:
' '
' '
= = 	 
efficient x
nk nk
nk' k
nk nk
x SSAITE
x x
(6) 
By construction, this measure of input-oriented technical efficiency is upper-bounded 
to one. Decision-making unit k’ will make an efficient use of input n when its computed
score of technical efficiency for that input equals one, i.e., no reduction of that input is 
feasible without decreasing any output. Conversely, input-specific technical inefficiency 
results in computed efficiency scores of less than one: the smaller this score, the lower 
the level of technical efficiency.
Including slacks in the measurement of technical efficiency reveals the full potential 
for improving firms’ performance. As noted, when the number of dimensions is large 
relative to the number of observations, slacks might be picking up an important part of 
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total potential input savings, and input-specific measures of efficiency provide a sub-
stantially enhanced picture of performance. The importance of slacks in explaining in-
put-specific technical efficiency can be assessed by computing the weighting of non-
radial input savings, i.e., those due to slacks, on total input savings. Formalising:
( )
( )
( )
( )
K Kradial efficient x
nk nk nkk=1 k=1
n K Kefficient x
nk nk k nk nkk=1 k=1
x x S
=
x x 1 x S

 =

   	 + 
 
 
 (7) 
= 	radial
nk k nkx x  being the use of input n by decision-making unit k that would result from 
the radial contraction of its vector of inputs toward the frontier.
3.- Data description.
The dataset we use in this paper corresponds to a sample of water utilities located in 
the southern Spanish region of Andalusia. The data were collected from a comprehen-
sive survey made by the authors with support and funding from the Agencia Andaluza 
del Agua of the regional government of Andalusia, and they correspond to the year 
2001. The survey was initially conducted on sixty-five water utilities, forming the vast 
majority of utilities in the region. Unfortunately, some companies did not answer the 
survey, while some others provided incomplete information about some relevant vari-
ables for our study. Lack of response or deficient information reduced our sample to 
thirty-four utilities, providing water services to more than one hundred municipalities 
and nearly four million inhabitants, covering almost fifty per cent of the population in 
the region.
Concerning the characterisation of the productive process of water utilities, three 
outputs were considered: water delivered, collected sewage and treated sewage, all 
measured in cubic meters. Inputs are: delivery network, sewer network (both measured 
in kilometres), labour (number of workers) and, finally, an intermediate input consisting 
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of ground, surface and purchased water (in cubic meters). Table 1 provides some de-
scriptive statistics of the data.
Insert Table 1 about here
An interesting feature of this dataset that lends a certain added value to our research 
is that, unlike most of the previous empirical work, water utilities are considered as 
multi-output firms producing the three main services or phases that integrate the urban 
water cycle. The first of these services is the distribution of water, which has been pre-
viously acquired and chemically treated to make it suitable for urban consumption. The 
second service is sewage collection, while the third service consists of treating sewage 
either to be delivered to the environment minimising its environmental impact or to be 
re-entered into the water cycle. Multi-output approaches are more usual in assessing cost 
efficiency, whereas previous literature dealing with technical efficiency has mostly con-
sidered water utilities as single-output firms providing the service of water delivery2. 
Fifty per cent of the water utilities in our sample provide the three services considered, 
while of the remaining companies 11 provide only the service of water delivery and 6 
the services of water delivery and sewage collection.
Finally, our dataset presents a couple of additional characteristics that enhance its 
usefulness in performing the analysis we carry out in this paper. On the one hand, out-
puts and inputs are all measured in physical units, greatly facilitating the economic in-
terpretation of our estimates of technical efficiency. On the other hand, the source of 
data provides a wide-ranging set of information on firms’ features and other environ-
mental variables, which are used to investigate the factors that could be related to differ-
ences among water utilities in respect of their technical efficiency.
2
 Only recent studies have included collected sewage or the amount of water treated, in addition to water 
delivered, as outputs of water companies (Estache and Trujillo, 2003, Tupper and Resende, 2004).
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4.- Empirical results and discussion.
4.1.- Measurement of technical efficiency.
The purpose of this section is to present and discuss our estimates of input-oriented 
technical performance for the thirty-four water utilities in the sample. Radial scores of 
input-oriented technical efficiency and slacks in inputs have been worked out by solving 
program (3), using the reference subset of efficient decision-making units of expression 
(2). Furthermore, slack-adjusted input-oriented scores of technical efficiency have been 
calculated according to expression (6). Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for 
both radial and input-specific measures of technical efficiency, in addition to a measure 
of the importance of slacks computed using expression (7). 
Insert Table 2 about here
Concerning the computed radial scores of efficiency, our results suggest that, on av-
erage, the water utilities in the sample could reduce equiproportionally their consump-
tion of inputs by nearly 5 per cent, while maintaining their levels of outputs, i.e., the 
radial index of technical efficiency is 0.952. The means of slack-adjusted scores of in-
put-oriented technical efficiency are, as they should be by construction, smaller than the 
average of radial efficiency. Sample averages for delivery network, sewer network, la-
bour, and the intermediate input consisting of ground, surface and purchased water, are 
0.885, 0.781, 0.894 and 0.951, respectively3. In addition, the standard deviations are 
noticeably larger than that computed for the radial measure. These outcomes show that 
3
 In order to facilitate the economic interpretation of these indices, let us take water utility number two in 
our sample and input labour as an example. This decision-making unit employs 130 workers. According to 
its computed score of radial input-oriented technical efficiency, which is equal to 0.855, it could reduce its 
use of labour by 14.5 per cent, which implies a reduction of 19 workers. In addition, computed input ex-
cess in labour for this utility would allow for a further shrinkage of 14 employees. In consequence, adding 
up radial reduction and input-specific excess, the aggregate reduction in labour necessary to achieve tech-
nical efficiency amounts to 33 workers, so that the efficient use of this input is 97 workers. Finally, the 
slack-adjusted score of technical efficiency for this water utility arises from the comparison of its efficient 
use of labour with actually observed use of this production factor, yielding a score of 0.747.
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greatest inefficiencies arise in the use of the sewer network, i.e., the average maximum 
attainable reduction of this production factor reaches 21.9 per cent, while the most effi-
cient management corresponds to ground, surface and purchased water, where potential 
saving reaches an average close to 5 per cent.
As to the importance of slacks in explaining the aggregate potential saving of inputs, 
our results show that, excluding the input consisting of ground, surface and purchased 
water, non-proportional potential reductions explain more than fifty per cent of total 
feasible input savings, a percentage that reaches 70 per cent for the sewer network. Fur-
thermore, all inefficient decision-making units have at least one slack in some input di-
rection. In other words, computing input-specific measures of technical efficiency, in-
stead of a single radial score of input-oriented technical efficiency, manifestly improves 
the assessment of technical performance in our sample of Spanish water utilities. In ad-
dition, computation for each utility in the sample of a set of scores of technical effi-
ciency at the input level allows us to test whether environmental variables affect the 
management of different production factors in different ways.
4.2.- Technical efficiency and environmental variables.
Empirical literature in the field of efficiency measurement has habitually performed 
two-stage analyses to investigate, in the second stage, the factors related to firms’ effi-
ciency scores obtained in the first stage. In performing the second stage, two primary 
methodological approaches have been followed. The most common approach involves 
using regression analysis, e.g., censored Tobit regression or ordinary least squares after 
transforming estimates of efficiency, to find out any factors capable of explaining effi-
ciency differences among decision-making units. Nonetheless, this procedure presents 
important shortcomings. From a conceptual view, Grosskopf (1996) noted that if the 
variables in the second-stage regression were (obviously) expected to have an effect on 
performance, they should have been included in the original first-stage model. Further-
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more, from a technical standpoint, Simar and Wilson (2006) show that second-stage 
analyses based on regressing first-stage DEA efficiency estimates against a set of ex-
planatory variables may lead to wrong results, mainly because of the serial correlation of 
the first-stage DEA estimates and the correlation between the error term and the set of 
covariates in the second stage.
The second approach entails grouping firms according to some specific features or 
environmental variables that seem likely to be related to efficiency, and then checking 
for the existence of statistically significant differences among groups as to their com-
puted scores of efficiency, e.g., using non-parametric tests of hypotheses. Our choice 
here is to follow this second approach, and test for significant differences among techni-
cal efficiency scores between water utilities categorised according to several operating 
environments. In order to do this, a simple t-test for equality of means, in addition to 
two non-parametric tests, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution test (KS) and the Mann-
Whitney ranksum test (MW), are used (Conover, 1999 provides details on these non-
parametric tests).
There is no formal theory as to what the determinants of differences in firms’ per-
formance should be. From a practical viewpoint, there are some features and environ-
mental variables that could help to explain such differences, including managerial skills, 
the degree of competition faced, agency objectives or the regime of ownership. The 
variables included in our second stage are drawn from previous literature, and also from 
our own beliefs regarding these factors in the case of water utilities. Furthermore, some 
of our environmental variables have been included in order to investigate any efficiency 
gains derived from certain managerial strategies strongly supported by local and re-
gional authorities in Andalusia, among them the privatisation of water companies and 
the creation of consortia of utilities. Obviously, our set of environmental variables is 
also conditioned by the availability of statistical information.
Page 12 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
page 13
The environmental variables are as follows. Ownership, which is a variable that dis-
tinguishes private water utilities from publicly owned companies. Services supplied, 
which separates utilities providing all three services of the urban water cycle, i.e., water 
delivery, sewage collection and sewage treatment, from the rest of the utilities in the 
sample. Density of population, making a distinction between utilities providing water 
services to areas of high density of population from those supplying low density areas4. 
Number of municipalities supplied, differentiating firms supplying a geographical area 
integrated by several municipalities from utilities that provide water services to only one 
municipality. Finally, tourism index is a variable aimed at differentiating firms located 
in tourist areas from utilities providing services to non-tourist municipalities5.
Averages of radial scores of firms’ technical efficiency according to operating envi-
ronments, and results from the t-tests for equality of means and the KS and MW tests, 
are reported in Table 3. Furthermore, Table 4 reports the averages of slack-adjusted 
technical efficiency scores by operating environments, in addition to the results of the t-
tests for equality of means. Finally, results for the KS and MW tests for input-specific 
scores of technical efficiency and operating environments are displayed in Table 5.
Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 about here
The most efficient form of utilities ownership is a long-standing issue of debate in 
economics. Concerning water utilities, a number of papers have focused on analysing 
whether differences exist between public and private companies regarding their manage-
rial efficiency (see Renzeti and Dupont, 2004 for a comprehensive review of the litera-
ture). Nonetheless, existing research does not provide conclusive support either to assert 
4
 Low and high density are defined in relation to the sample average, so that areas of low density of popu-
lation are those with a density below the average density in the sample. Conversely, high density areas are 
characterised by a density of population above the sample average. Figures on density of population come 
from the official statistics of the regional Instituto Andaluz de Estadística.
5
 This variable is also defined by taking the sample average as reference. The intensity of tourism has been 
measured according to the tourism index provided by La Caixa (2004).
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unequivocally the superiority of one regime of ownership over the other, or to affirm 
that privatisation leads to efficiency improvements. Without aiming to be exhaustive, 
some papers have found empirical evidence supporting better performance on the part of 
public utilities (Bruggink, 1982; Lambert et al., 1993; Bhattacharyya et al., 1994, 
1995a), while other authors consider that privately owned water utilities outperform 
public utilities (Morgan, 1977; Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978; Bhattacharyya et al., 1995b). 
Inconclusive evidence is also found (Feigembaum and Teeples, 1983; Byrnes et al., 
1986; Fox and Hofler, 1986; Jones and Mygind, 2000; Ménard and Saussier, 2000; Es-
tache and Rossi, 2002).
During the last two decades, many Spanish municipalities decided to transfer the 
management of water utilities from public to private managers, arguing that this would 
lead to efficiency gains. Privatisation continues to take place in Andalusia, but no em-
pirical studies exist supporting the hypothetical gains of efficiency associated with this 
managerial strategy. In our sample, 26 out of 34 Andalusian water utilities are under 
private ownership, while the remaining firms are public utilities. Within the former 
group, i.e., private firms, some companies whose ownership is shared between private 
and public stakeholders have been included. They have been treated as private firms 
because responsibility for basic management decisions is always delegated to private 
managers.
According to our results, the average technical efficiency scores for privately and 
publicly owned water utilities are 0.956 and 0.937, respectively, the difference being 
statistically insignificant. In addition, the hypothesis that both samples, i.e., private and 
public utilities, are drawn from the same distribution cannot be rejected. In other words, 
we find no empirical evidence that one regime of ownership outperforms the other. 
Nonetheless, in this paper we aim to go further in the assessment of the relationship be-
tween efficiency and ownership. Our relevant question here is: might differences in 
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technical efficiency exist between public and private water utilities as to their manage-
ment of specific production factors?
The answer to this question is that private water utilities outperform publicly owned 
utilities in technical management of both labour and delivery pipelines. On the one 
hand, labour-specific scores of efficiency are 0.928 for private firms and 0.783 for pub-
lic utilities, the difference being statistically significant (the computed p-value is 0.063). 
In addition, both samples, i.e., labour-efficiency of private and public utilities, can be 
said to come from different underlying populations. A reasonable hypothesis that could 
explain, at least partly, this finding is that publicly owned utilities face greater restric-
tions in adjusting wages and levels of labour force than private utilities. Affiliation to 
unions is greater among workers of publicly-owned utilities, and public utilities have 
less incentive than private companies to resist pressures of workers that could lead to 
political conflicts. Thus, the attitude of publicly-owned companies’ managers when they 
face worker’s demands is usually weaker than that adopted by managers of private water 
utilities.
On the other hand, scores of technical efficiency in the management of delivery pipe-
lines are 0.916 and 0.784 for private and public water utilities, respectively, with a p-
value for the difference of means of 0.086. Although we have no clear arguments to 
explain this outcome, a reasoning that could be of some help is that publicly-owned 
companies usually face stronger budgetary restrictions than private firms, making it dif-
ficult to fund the works necessary to maintain pipelines and adapt them to changes in 
spatial distribution of population and demand. This actually happened in Spain, espe-
cially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when public indebtedness prevented utilities 
belonging to local governments from undertaking the works necessary to maintain de-
livery pipelines in many Spanish municipalities (Soler, 2003). In addition, it might be 
the case that private companies were tending to take over the management of areas with 
more favourable conditions in their pipe network for efficient operation.
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Given that in our sample the number of water services provided differs from one util-
ity to another, it might make sense to test for differences in efficiency among utilities 
providing the entire urban water cycle, i.e., the services of water delivery, sewage col-
lection and sewage treatment, and utilities that only supply one or two of these services. 
The variable services supplied is intended here for this purpose. Other studies have 
tested for the existence of scope economies in water utilities derived from cost reduc-
tions as the number of water services provided increases (Hayes, 1987, Lynk, 1993, 
Hunt and Lynk, 1995, Saal and Parker, 2000, Fraquelli et al., 2005). However, most of 
these papers only consider two of the services representative of the urban water cycle, 
water distribution and sewage collection. Although we do not measure cost reductions 
as the number of water services increases, but gains in technical efficiency, a noteworthy 
feature of our paper is that we also include the service of sewage treatment. However, 
our results indicate that the average of radial technical efficiency is not statistically dif-
ferent for utilities providing the entire urban water cycle and utilities that only supply 
one or two services6. Neither it is possible to affirm that both samples come from differ-
ent distributions.
Our primary hypothesis as to the relationship between the number of services offered 
and efficiency in the management of specific inputs, is that utilities providing the entire 
urban water cycle could have the chance of being more efficient in the management of 
the intermediate input consisting of ground, surface and purchased water. The reason is 
that some of the sewage collected might be treated and then re-entered into the water 
cycle, at least for specific uses, e.g., to irrigate golf courses. However, we do not also 
obtain empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Probably, the reason is that, for 
6
 In addition, we have run the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Conover, 1999 for details), which generalizes the 
MW test for more than two samples, considering three groups of utilities, i.e., firms that only provide the 
service of water delivery, utilities supplying water delivery and sewage collection and, finally, utilities 
supplying the entire urban water cycle. Nevertheless, differences among groups were found to be statisti-
cally insignificant.
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the moment, most of the Andalusian water utilities providing the three services of the 
urban water cycle only carry out what we might call a soft treatment of sewage, not al-
lowing water to be reutilized, but rather dumping it onto the local environment in such a 
way that its environmental impact is minimised. In fact, regional and also European au-
thorities are currently encouraging Andalusian water utilities to treat sewage in order to 
avoid environmental damage. Nevertheless, still very few companies recycle sewage 
allowing its re-utilization, since the use of recycled water is restricted to certain uses, 
which exclude human consumption and, in some areas, agricultural use.
The next operating scenario we consider is determined by the density of population 
of the geographical area supplied. A number of papers have already introduced this vari-
able to test for its impact on the efficiency of water companies. Although most of them 
have focused on cost efficiency, their results seem to confirm the existence of econo-
mies of density, i.e., the higher the density of population the greater the level of effi-
ciency (Mann and Mikesell, 1976, Teeples and Glyer, 1987, Fabbri and Fraquelli 2000, 
Antonioli and Filippini, 2001 and Estache and Rossi, 2002, among others). Inconclusive 
evidence is also found by García and Thomas (2001), while Tupper and Resende (2004) 
find empirical evidence supporting the existence of density economies in the provision 
of the service of water delivery, but not in the service of sewage collection. In our re-
search, we find that technical efficiency is statistically greater for utilities supplying ar-
eas of high density of population than for companies serving sparsely populated areas. 
Average scores of efficiency are 0.985 and 0.938, respectively. In addition, results from 
KS and MW tests allow us to assert that both samples, i.e., utilities supplying high and 
low density areas, are drawn from different populations.
Concerning the relationship between density of population and input-specific techni-
cal efficiency, our empirical evidence is inconclusive. Although the mean of technical
efficiency in managing delivery network is, as expected, greater for firms located in ar-
eas of higher density of population than for utilities providing water services to less 
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populated areas, high standard errors prevent us from obtaining conclusive empirical 
evidence as to the statistical significance of this difference.
Let us now address the study of the relationship between efficiency and the number 
of municipalities supplied. About two thirds of the companies in the sample (23 out of 
34 firms) supply water services to only one municipality, while the remaining 11 utili-
ties provide services to two or more municipalities. The foremost reason for including 
this variable is, as noted, that regional politicians gave strong support to the creation of 
consortia of water utilities in Andalusia, arguing that this managerial strategy would 
improve efficiency.
Consortia of water utilities arise normally from agreements among small municipali-
ties that decide to create a common entity to supply water services to them. However, 
our results provide weak empirical support for technical efficiency gains, other than 
possible scale economies associated with an increase in size. Only technical efficiency 
in managing the sewer network statistically differs between water utilities that provide 
services to one municipality and utilities supplying several municipalities. Nonetheless, 
the hypothesis that both samples are drawn from the same population cannot be rejected. 
Hence, further research is needed to investigate in depth where any efficiency gains de-
rived from consortia of water companies are hidd n. Perhaps the main savings associ-
ated with this managerial strategy may have to do with variables not considered in this 
study. For instance, one of the reasons why consortia may be a profitable strategy could 
be the ability to avoid duplication of billing and customer services.
The last hypothesis we consider in our second-stage analysis is motivated by the fact 
that a number of water companies in the sample provide water services to highly tourist 
municipalities. These municipalities are principally located along the Mediterranean 
seacoast, and their population increases seasonally more than twofold, mainly during 
summer holidays. Some studies have already pointed to seasonal variation in water de-
mand as a factor likely related to efficiency in water utilities (Woodbury and Dollery, 
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2004). Our empirical results give support to this relationship. Computed scores of tech-
nical efficiency are 0.994 and 0.936 for firms located in tourist and non-tourist areas, 
respectively, the difference being statistically significant (p-value is 0.025). Moreover, 
we also accept the hypothesis that the two samples come from different populations. 
Additionally, utilities located in tourist areas are more efficient at managing labour and 
the intermediate input consisting of ground, surface and purchased water.
Regarding labour, greater technical efficiency could be sensibly explained if water 
utilities made their decisions about contracting labour considering the permanent popu-
lation, without bearing in mind the population who come temporarily in holiday time or 
other peak seasons. In this way, water utilities located in tourist areas would require 
workers to contribute a greater labour effort at times of greater influx of tourists or other 
foreign population. Probably this will also imply a lower quality of the service (Lin, 
2005). Unfortunately, lack of information about variables relating to the quality of the 
service (time taken to repair breakdowns, water pressure, among others) precludes fur-
ther considerations on this question. Finally, the reasons for the greater efficiency of 
utilities located in tourist municipalities in the management of ground, surface and pur-
chased water are really straightforward. On the one hand, during some months of the 
year, these utilities under-use a part of their delivery network, precisely that intended to 
deliver water to the temporary population, avoiding losses of water along pipelines. On 
the other hand, since mass tourism in Andalusia is relatively recent and also a growing 
phenomenon, many tourist areas have younger and modern delivery networks that also 
avoid losses of water.
The ultimate purpose of our research is to try to bring economic analysis closer to the 
concerns of both firms’ managers and policy-makers. Beyond the interest that our find-
ings could have for the managers of water utilities, we would like to highlight a couple 
of results that, in our view, touch on interesting issues of economic policy, chiefly for 
the regional government of Andalusia and, also, for local councils of Andalusian mu-
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nicipalities. First, we obtain empirical evidence showing that the privatisation of public 
water utilities carried out in the region of Andalusia from the eighties onward, and 
firmly supported by public authorities, led to improvements of efficiency but only re-
garding certain production factors, mainly labour. Second, we obtain really poor empiri-
cal evidence of technical efficiency gains associated with consortia of water utilities, a 
managerial strategy that also had strong support from Andalusian politicians.
Finally, our research also identifies several directions for further investigation. On the 
one hand, a number of environmental factors influencing technical efficiency in water 
companies are identified, so further empirical research should include computation of 
efficiency scores accounting explicitly for different operating environments. On the 
other hand, availability of data on water utilities’ costs and input prices could allow our 
research to be extended to the study of allocative and cost efficiencies and their relation-
ship with the quality of the service.
5.- Summary and concluding remarks
The literature dealing with efficiency and productivity measurement has a deep-
rooted tradition in the field of economics. This manuscript provides further empirical 
evidence concerning the managerial efficiency of water utilities. Our aim is twofold. On 
the one hand, a set of input-specific scores of technical efficiency is computed for a 
sample of water companies located in the southern Spanish region of Andalusia. On the 
other hand, a second-stage analysis is performed to learn about environmental factors 
related to differences in efficiency among water utilities. In doing so, both DEA tech-
niques and some tests of hypotheses are utilised. Compared with previous literature, a 
contribution of this manuscript worth mentioning is that we make available measures of 
technical efficiency that vary across production factors, also providing empirical evi-
dence as to the relationship between water utilities’ input-specific efficiency and some 
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operating environments. In addition, this paper leads empirical research dealing with the 
assessment of managerial efficiency of water utilities in the Spanish region of Andalu-
sia, where increasing desertification and water shortage have turned efficient manage-
ment of this natural resource into a dire necessity.
Concerning efficiency measurement, our main results are as follows. First, average 
radial efficiency is found to be fairly high, with relatively small differences among water 
utilities. Second, as to technical efficiency in the management of specific inputs, greater 
inefficiency appears in the use of the sewer network, while the most efficient manage-
ment corresponds to the intermediate input consisting of ground, surface and purchased 
water. Third, non-proportional potential reductions of inputs due to slacks explain a 
large part of aggregate technical inefficiency, and consequently the computation of in-
put-specific measures of efficiency, rather than a single radial score, noticeably im-
proves the assessment of technical performance in Spanish water utilities.
Regarding efficiency and operating environments, an overriding conclusion is that 
computation of input-specific scores of technical efficiency helps to discover important 
features that would have remained out of sight with the mere study of the relationship 
between the environmental variables and a radial measure of technical efficiency. Some 
of these findings are as follows. In relation to the long-lasting debate about ownership 
and efficiency in water utilities, we contribute empirical evidence showing that privately 
owned water utilities outperform public companies but only in the management of spe-
cific production factors, principally labour. Furthermore, we find evidence supporting 
the existence of economies of density in the provision of water services, i.e., technical 
efficiency of water utilities is greater for firms serving densely populated areas. Our re-
sults also reveal that Andalusian utilities providing water services to tourist municipali-
ties display greater efficiency scores in their management of labour and of the interme-
diate input consisting of ground, surface and purchased water. Conversely, no empirical 
evidence is found supporting either an increase of technical efficiency as the number of 
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water services offered increases, or efficiency gains associated with consortia of utilities 
providing water services to several municipalities.
Our belief is that apart from their academic interest, these findings lead to two eco-
nomic policy implications. First, privatisation of water utilities in Andalusia leads to 
improvements in efficiency but only in respect of certain production factors, mainly la-
bour. Second, the argument of efficiency gains used by local and regional authorities to 
encourage the formation of consortia of water utilities finds weak empirical support in 
our research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1
Sample description.
Variable Measurement unit Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum Minimum
Outputs
Water delivered Thousands of m3 9,695 17,635 84,800 212
Collected sewage Thousands of m3 8,901 21,828 108,666 0
Treated sewage Thousands of m3 8,220 21,994 108,666 0
Inputs
Delivery network Kilometres 356 583 2,877 5
Sewer network Kilometres 203 387 1,855 0
Labour Number of workers 81 141 732 2
Ground, surface and 
purchased water Thousands of m3 12,627 22,370 107,733 315
Table 2
Computed scores of input-oriented technical efficiency.
Mean
Standard
deviation Maximum Minimum
Importance 
of slacks (n)
Radial technical efficiency 0.952 0.068 1 0.798 -
Slack-adjusted input-specific technical efficiency
Delivery network 0.885 0.191 1 0.244 0.63
Sewer network (1) 0.781 0.258 1 0.130 0.70
Labour 0.894 0.194 1 0.175 0.56
Ground, surface and purchased water 0.951 0.068 1 0.798 0.01
(1) Computed only for water utilities making use of this production factor.
Page 27 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
page 28
Table 3.-
Radial scores of technical efficiency categorised by operating environments.
Two sample t-test for
equality of means (1)
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (2)
Mann-
Whitney test (3)
Mean
Difference 
of means (4)
t-statistic
(p-value)
KS-statistic
(p-value)
Z-statistic
(p-value)
Ownership
Private firms 0.956 0.679 1.195 1.474
Public firms 0.937 0.019 (0.502) (0.206) (0.140)
Services supplied
Entire urban water cycle 0.939 -1.071 0.857 -1.383
Only part of the urban water cycle 0.964 -0.025 (0.292) (0.245) (0.167)
Density of population
Firms supplying high density areas 0.985 1.914* 1.284* 2.246**
Firms supplying low density areas 0.938 0.047 (0.065) (0.051) (0.025)
Number of municipalities supplied
Several municipalities 0.963 0.690 0.927 1.033
Only one municipality 0.945 0.018 (0.494) (0.273) (0.301)
Tourism index
Firms located on tourist areas 0.994 2.354** 1.235* 1.954*
Firms located on non-tourist areas 0.936 0.058 (0.025) (0.064) (0.051)
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent.
(1) The null hypothesis is that the difference of means is equal to zero.
(2) The null hypothesis is that the distribution of the two samples is the same.
(3) In this case, the null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from the same population.
(4) Mean of the first group minus mean of the second group.
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Table 4.-
Input-specific scores of technical efficiency categorised by operating environments. Two sample t-test for equality of means.
Delivery network Sewer network (1) Labour Ground, surface and purchased water
Mean
t-statistic
(p-value) Mean
t-statistic
(p-value) Mean
t-statistic
(p-value) Mean
t-statistic
(p-value)
Ownership
Private firms 0.916 1.770* 0.801 0.549 0.928 1.927* 0.956 0.668
Public firms 0.784 (0.086) 0.736 (0.589) 0.783 (0.063) 0.937 (0.509)
Services supplied
Entire urban water cycle 0.819 -2.132** 0.791 0.296 0.864 -0.899 0.939 -1.087
Only part of the urban water cycle 0.952 (0.041) 0.754 (0.770) 0.924 (0.376) 0.964 (0.285)
Density of population
Firms supplying high density areas 0.924 0.761 0.804 0.301 0.882 -0.227 0.945 -0.372
Firms supplying low density areas 0.869 (0.452) 0.769 (0.766) 0.899 (0.822) 0.954 (0.713)
Number of municipalities supplied
Several municipalities 0.906 0.439 0.896 1.801* 0.896 0.041 0.963 0.702
Only one municipality 0.875 (0.664) 0.707 (0.086) 0.893 (0.968) 0.946 (0.488)
Tourism index
Firms located on tourist areas 0.950 1.204 0.905 1.574 0.991 1.799* 0.994 2.362**
Firms located on non-tourist areas 0.862 (0.238) 0.727 (0.130) 0.859 (0.082) 0.936 (0.024)
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent.
(1) Means have been computed excluding water utilities that do not make use of this production factor.
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Table 5.-
Input-specific scores of technical efficiency categorised by operating environments. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS-statistic) and 
Mann-Whitney (Z-statistic) tests for equality of populations and distribution functions.
Delivery network Sewer network (1) Labour Ground, surface and purchased water
KS-statistic
(p-value)
Z-statistic
(p-value)
KS-statistic
(p-value)
Z-statistic
(p-value)
KS-statistic
(p-value)
Z-statistic
(p-value)
KS-statistic
(p-value)
Z-statistic
(p-value)
Ownership 1.047
(0.148)
2.011**
(0.044)
0.749
(0.473)
0.837
(0.403)
1.094
(0.134)
1.810*
(0.070)
0.999
(0.206)
1.479
(0.140)
Services supplied 0.857
(0.245)
1.763*
(0.078)
0.578
(0.754)
0.138
(0.855)
0.857
(0.245)
-1.497
(0.134)
0.857
(0.245)
-1.383
(0.167)
Density of population 0.553
(0.858)
0.042
(0.967)
0.514
(0.864)
0.337
(0.736)
0.664
(0.687)
-0.437
(0.662)
0.664
(0.687)
-0.374
(0.708)
Number of municipalities supplied 0.927
(0.273)
1.114
(0.265)
1.077
(0.114)
1.840*
(0.066)
0.809
(0.425)
1.074
(0.283)
0.972
(0.273)
1.033
(0.302)
Tourism index 1.052
(0.162)
1.590
(0.112)
0.926
(0.249)
1.708*
(0.088)
1.235*
(0.064)
1.912*
(0.056)
1.235*
(0.064)
1.954*
(0.051)
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent.
(1) Means of efficiency have been computed excluding water utilities that do not make use of this production factor.
Page 30 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
